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Abstract: 
dŚŝƐ ƉĂƉĞƌ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ŽĨ  ?ĞŵďŽĚŝŵĞŶƚ ?  ?DĞƌůĞĂƵ-Ponty, 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŽĨ  ?ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ĂŶĚ  ĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ĂƐĨŝƌƐƚĚĞǀŝƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌƐŽŵĞĨŝĨƚĞĞŶǇĞĂƌƐĂŐŽ
as an undergraduate student, and applies them to debates regarding 
neurodiversity.  These concepts were devised by the author many 
years prior to being diagnosed as being on the autistic spectrum, 
ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ďĞĞŶ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ĂƐ  ?ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ? ĨƌŽŵ Ă ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ
mental illnesses by a number of psychiatrists in his youth.  Drawing 
upon Marxist and Phenomenological theories in particular, these 
concepts are explained through an eclectic citation of references 
ranging from Lao Tsu to Jimi Hendrix.  These philosophical/sociological 
conceptions will be contrasted with those of others within the 
neurodiversity movement as a way of highlighting the need for 
 ?ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĂďůŝŶŐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽĨďĞŝŶŐ ŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ
others of similar disposition.  It is hoped that through this overview, a 
theoretical account of autistic difference being a normal part of the 
diversity characteristic of all nature, and thus hopefully dislodging the 
ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ ?ŶŽƌŵĂůĐǇ ? ? 








Embodied sociality and the conditioned 
relativism of dispositional diversity 
By Damian Milton 
Introduction 
´6RFUDWHV ...there are two types of madness, one arising from human disease, the other when heaven sets us 
free from established convention.  
Phaedrus: AJUHHGµ3ODWR-81).  
7KURXJKRXW KXPDQ KLVWRU\ WKHUH KDV EHHQ QDUUDWLYHV UHJDUGLQJ ´PDGQHVVµ DQG SV\FKRORJLFDO DEQRUPDOLW\
The above quote from the dialogues of Plato sets out two very differing narratives however that have 
persisted to this day.  The former describes madness in terms of an illness, a disease that blights the mental 
faculties of those who suffer from it.  The latter a far more positive view of mental abnormality that frames 
VXFK GHYLDQFH DV D VHWWLQJ IUHH IURP ´HVWDEOLVKHG FRQYHQWLRQµ  ,Q WKH GLDORJXH 6RFUDWHV DQG 3KDHGUXV
separate these two narratives out to define two differing types of mental abnormality, one good and one not.  
Yet in the narratives surrounding mental and neurological diversities today similar narratives abound of both 
NLQGVUHJDUGLQJWKHVDPHVRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHG´FRQGLWLRQVµ 
This paper charts the development of a philosophy regarding the dispositional diversity of human agency that 
originated in my own undergraduate study some fifteen years ago.  As a teenager I had been labelled with 
a number of psychiatric conditions, all of which did not sit well with my own personal experiences and 
understandings.  This led to an aversion of the psychiatric profession, yet also the beginning of a search to 
understand why I felt so socially different.  This search led me to the study of philosophy and sociology, where 
I began to build theories regarding dispositional diversity and the conditioned relativism of human agency. 





It was during this period that I also studied the works of radical psychiatrists and work regarding the social 
model of disability.  These ideas were brought sharply to focus however when my son was diagnosed as 
autistic some years ago.  In researching autism it became apparent that I myself could be considered as on 
the autism spectrum and I was later diagnosed in 2009 at the age of thirty-six.  In the years before my 
diagnosis I had become increasingly aware that I was not alone in my philosophical ruminations, as to my 
VXUSULVHWKHUHZDVDQHQWLUH´QHXURGLYHUVLW\µPRYHPHQWDOUHDG\LQH[LVWHQFH 
Drawing upon Marxist and Phenomenological theories in particular, this paper explores the concepts of 
dispositional diversity and conditioned relativism.  These philosophical/sociological conceptions will be 
contrasted with those of others within the neurodiversity movement as a way of highlighting the need for 
 ?ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝƐĂďůŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƐŽĨƐŝŵŝůĂƌĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚŝƐŚŽƉĞĚ
that through this overview, a theoretical account of autism and neurodiversity will be presented. 
Conditioned relativism and dispositional diversity 




´0HQ PDNH WKHLU RZQ KLVWRU\ EXW WKH\ GR QRW PDNH LW MXVW DV WKH\ SOHDVH«7KH WUDGLWLRQ RI DOO WKH GHDG
JHQHUDWLRQVZHLJKVOLNHDQLJKWPDUHRQWKHEUDLQRIWKHOLYLQJµ0DU[ 
It has long been recognised that people are both materially and discursively produced and conditioned within 
an historical and cultural context.  Yet such assertions can also lead to a philosophy of mind that is purely 
deterministic, running contrary to the liberal ideals of free will, choice, rights and responsibilities.  According to 
the theory of conditioned relativism, unconstrained free will is a myth, with every entity being somewhat 
interconnected with the material and social nexus which produced them.  The appearance of a unified self 
with a coherent consciousness able to freely act being an illusion created by each embodied person being 
conditioned uniquely and relativistically.  Despite the entity of a self being entirely dependent on the material 
and social environment it finds itself in, the emergent property of consciousness is, within this conceptualisation, 
uniquely dependent on the somatic affordances (physical limitations) of a physical brain.  Thus social agents 
are constructed in a unique way, yet one which is fully configured within a material and social environment.  
An entity dependent on the social for survival and yet is an active agent within it.  Although all humans are 
conditioned in this way, each occupies a unique trajectory in their development, each building their own 
experiences and perceptions of social life and even their use of language.  Language may contain what is 
communicable, yet much meaning is lost in translation (Milton, 2012).  Such issues are further contorted by 
social positionality and relations of power.  The social perception of the socially alienated outsider (Becker, 
1963) has long been of issue in social theorising and is reflected by attempts to both normalise populations 
deemed as deviant, and in reactions of ¶LQVLGHU· VWDQGSRLQW HSLVWHPRORJ\ FRQFHUQV UHJDUGLQJ UHIOHFWLRQ LQ
practice and on positionality in research, feminist concerns of situated knowledge, and more recently the 
H[SUHVVLRQVRI´QHXURGLYHUVHµDFWLYLVWV 
´([WUHPHVRIDQ\FRPELQDWLRQFRPHWREHseen as 'psychiatric deviance'. In the argument presented here, where 
GLVRUGHUEHJLQVLVHQWLUHO\GRZQWRVRFLDOFRQYHQWLRQDQGZKHUHRQHGHFLGHVWRGUDZWKHOLQHDFURVVWKHVSHFWUXPµ
(Milton, 1999 - VSHFWUXPUHIHUULQJWRWKH´KXPDQVSHFWUXPRIGLVSRVLWLRQDOGLYHUVLW\µ 
The outcome of the conditioned relativism of human embodied sociality creates a diversity of dispositions and 
GHYHORSPHQWDOWUDMHFWRULHV7KXVLQWKHIRUPXODWLRQWKHUHLVQR´QHXUR-W\SLFDOµWRGHYLDWHIURPRWKHUWKDQDQ
idealised fantastical construction of Galtonian inspired psychological measurement.  The above quote suggests 
WKDW WKHUH DUH DUELWUDU\ OLQHV ´GUDZQ LQ WKH VDQGµ EHWZHHQ ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV QRUPDOLW\ DQG SV\FKLDWULF RU
indeed neurological) deviance from often arbitrary measurements comparing the development of children 
against a flawed theory of stages and milestones. 
Trait theories of personality 
Throughout history, personality was conceived of in terms of types, perhaps the earliest being those of 
Hippocrates in Ancient Greece, who divided people into categories: melancholic, choleric, phlegmatic and 
sanguine; based upon a scientifically naïve notion of an excess or lack of bodily humours.  Butt (2007) 
explains how contemporary theories regarding individual differences in personality grew from three dominant 
psychological traditions: Experimental, Psychometric and Clinical.  All of these strands of thought are 
interested in the individual differences that people express, in terms of behaviour and what is commonly 
perceived as personality.  The experimental tradition, often argued to be the dominant one within twentieth 
century psychology began with behaviourist theories, before being largely surpassed by cognitive theories in 
the latter half of the century.  The psychometric tradition originated in attempts to measure cognitive abilities 
such as intelligence, establishing traits (ways in which individuals could be said to differ from one another). 




7UDLWWKHRULHVDUHH[HPSOLILHGLQWKHZRUNRI(\VHQFNDQG5DFKPDQ·VVWXG\ where classification is seen 
DV IXQGDPHQWDO WR WKH ´VFLHQWLILF VWXG\ RI KXPDQ SHUVRQDOLW\µ  (\VHQFN DQG 5DFKPDQ  VXJJHVW WKDW
through the use of factor analysis, clustering groups of traits and then reducing these to super-ordinate 
measurements, individuals could be measured using standardised scales along two personality dimensions that 
could be shown to endure over time: extraversion-introversion and neuroticism-stability.  Differences along 
these continuums were then said to be linked to biological differences.  Eysenck and Rachman (1965) then 
contended that personality inventories could be used to make predictions about how people were likely to act 
in certain situations and make comparisons between individuals. 
Interestingly, Eysenck and Rachman (1965) utilised the same four personality types as originally described by 
Hippocrates, yet clustered certain personality traits within these types, identified by psychometric 
questionnaires measuring personality across the two crossing continuums of introversion-extraversion and 
neurosis-stability.  An interesting analogy can be made between extremes of these types and the characters 
RI WKH ¶:LQQLH-the-3RRK· VWRULHV  7KHPHODQFKROLF GLVSRVLWLRQ LQWURYHUWHG-QHXURWLF H[HPSOLILHGE\ (H\RUH·V
depressive nature (Moody, Rigid, and Pessimistic) and the social anxiety of Piglet (Anxious, Reserved, and 
Quiet).  The choleric temperament (extraverted-neurotic) characterised by Tigger and possibly Roo (Restless, 
Excitable, Impulsive, Optimistic, and Active).  There is also the phlegmatic characters (introverted-stable) of 
Owl and Pooh himself (Passive, Thoughtful, and Calm), and even the sanguine personality (extraverted-stable) 
of Rabbit taken to the extreme of a somewhat authoritarian personality (Outgoing, Talkative, and 
Responsive).  According to normative categorisations of abnormal deviance, all such extremes of 
psychiatric/neurological divergence are pathologised with misguided attempts to normalise such character 
types.  Even if this were possible, it is argued here that attempts at behavioural modification are like 
attempting to change the characters of the hundred-acre wood to be indistinguishable from Christopher Robin. 
The same psychometric methodologies have been used in the creation of autism quotient tests (Baron-Cohen, 
2003) and reflect an appeal to scientific credibility and an adherence to the use of quantitative data 
collection and analysis.  In criticism to such approaches, Butt (2007) argues that social psychological 
knowledge, rather than being based on pre-existing phenomena waiting to be discovered, suggests that 
knowledge is constructed and situated historically and culturally.  Knowledge therefore, is seen as being 
socially situated and not a measurable and objective standard separated from those who produce it. 
Trait theory rests upon the assumption that a consistent structure of personality resides in each individual 
person, yet perceptions of attributes related to others may have more to do with those doing the perceiving, 
than those being peUFHLYHG  7UDLWV IURP WKLV YLHZ DUH QRWKLQJ PRUH WKDQ FRQVWUXFWLRQV LQ WKH ¶H\H RI WKH
EHKROGHU·WKDWUHIOHFWDZRUOGYLHZRIWKHSHUFHLYHUURRWHGZLWKLQFXOWXUDOLGHRORJLHVDQGQRWDUHIOHFWLRQRI
inner psychological dispositions of those being rated.  Mischel (1968, cited in Butt, 2007) argues that 
attributions of disposition made about others reflect the perceptual prejudices of the onlooker.  He found that 
SHRSOHZLOOUDWHRWKHUV·DWWULEXWHVKDYLQJREVHUYHGWKHPYHU\EULHIO\DQGWKDWEHKDYLRXUDOWUDLWV rarely show 
the consistency that trait theorists suggest.  These findings suggest a fundamental attribution error is being 
made by trait theories, with those doing the rating attributing dispositions to the actions and behaviours of 
others without any justification.  Mischel (1968, cited in Butt, 2007) also criticised the questionnaires used in 
SV\FKRPHWULFWHVWLQJZLWKZRUGVVXFKDV´RIWHQµEHLQJFRQVWUXHGWRPHDQGLIIHUHQWWKLQJVWRGLIIHUHQWSHRSOH
and are thus an invalid indicator of some underlying trait, accordingly, behaviour is theorised as much more 
context specific and situated.  Thus, trait theory does not attempt to capture the unique richness of individual 
character, but rather measure and classify it.  




It can be argued that the nomothetic approach adopted by trait theory offer little more than a description of 
behaviour and displays a circularity of reasoning, for example: explaining aggressive behaviour by saying 
someone is aggressive.  In response to this criticism, such theorists suggest that personality traits can be related 
to underlying physiological factors.  In so doing, they attempt to avoid the criticism that trait theory just re-
describes phenomena, by positing a materialist account of behaviour and the mind-body problem within 
philosophy, an account for human action based in unchangeable and stable biological difference. 
Within the framework of conditioned relativism, a diversity of dispositions ensues, yet rather than being 
unchangeable and stable differences based purely in biology, dispositions are also forged in unique social 
positionalities ² an ever-changing embodied sociality.  In constant movement more analogous with the river 
flowing through the hundred-acre wood then the reductionist accounts of trait theorists. 
´1RWKLQJHQGXUHVEXWFKDQJHµ² Heraclitus 
Social normativity and the sick role 
´:KHQ\RXUHDOLVHWKHUHLVQRWKLQJODFNLQJWKHZKROHZRUOGEHORQJVWR\RXµ² Lao Tzu 
In contrast to the philosophy of Hercalitus or Lao Tzu, alongside the ideology of normalcy, deviance and lack 
being symptomatic of psychological trait theorists through the ages, notions of social normativity have also 
flourished.  Such normative theories have indeed dominated much political philosophy and early sociological 
theory, the founding fathers of normative sociological discourse being Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim.  
Durkheim (1897) suggested that individuals had a personal need for a state of equilibrium regarding the 
UHJXODWLRQRIRQH·VPRUDOYDOXHVDQGLQWHJUDWLRQLQWRVRFLHW\7RROLWWOHRUtoo much could lead to dysfunction 
and even suicide through social anomie.  Thus people were seen to need a level of social control and sanction, 
for their own good and for the good of society.  Despite Durkheim (1897) believing that society needed a 
certain amount of social deviance in order to maintain enough dynamism for change, he also argued that 
deviance was functional for reinforcing the norms and values of society.  Thus the positioning of some of the 
population as deviant outsiders was an inevitable part of a functioning society, reifying inequality and notions 
of the idealised norm in contrast to a deviant other. 
The functionalist notions of Durkheim (1897) were embedded within the sociological theorising of the Post-
War American theorist Talcott Parsons (1951) who developed the theory of the sick role.  Within this 
conceptualisation illness and disability were seen as a deviancy from functional norms in need of professional 
monitoring and surveillance.  Thus power became vested in the professional expert as a gatekeeper to the 
sick role and not the patient, literally seen as a role of being patient for the expert advice offered by the 
PHGLFDOSURIHVVLRQZKLFKZDVWREHIROORZHGLQRUGHUWRUHPHGLDWHRQH·VFRQGLWLRQDQGWDNHRQH·VSODFHEDFN
in the economy.  This system was seen as an ideal type model upon which to base service provision. 
With rising life expectancy in many highly-developed societies in the post-War era, and increasing numbers 
of people being classified as long-term ill or disabled, Safilios-Rothschild (1970) expanded Parsonian notions 
of the sick role to include people who were deemed unable to achieve a level of functional norms: the 
rehabilitation role.  The reasoning here consisting of those deemed disabled to make every effort to achieve 
as close a fit to normality as was possible, or as Goffman (1963) would have critiqued as leading to 
stigmatisation, to pass as normal. 
Functionalist ideals of normalcy have dominated the field of autism studies, with the autistic lifeworld being 
invaded by a never-ending tide of interventions that try to eradicate autistic styles of diversity.  Such a 
medicalisation and psychologisation of autism has led to internalised oppression and psycho-emotional 




disablement (Reeve, 2011; Milton and Moon, 2012) and the rise in psychopharmacology in attempts to 
FRQWURODQGSODFDWHSHRSOHZLWKJHQXLQH´SUREOHPVRIOLYLQJµ 
´,FDQQRWIRUHVHH3UR]DFJDLQLQJPXFKPRUHSRSXODULW\SHUKDSVEHFDXVHRIWKHVWXEERUQQHVVDQGSHUVHYHUDQFH
of people like myself, who despite living through a 'culture of depression', refuse to be swept along by the rise of 




Fragmented phenomenological constructions of social reality 
The phenomenologist Alfred Schutz (1967) split experiences of the social lifeworld into four different aspects: 
the umwelt (directly experienced social reality), mitwelt (experiences interacting with contemporaries), vorwelt 
(previous experiences) and fogwelt (imaginations of future possible experiences to come).  For Schutz (1967) 
as people develop there is a general transition within the lifeworld between direct to indirect understandings 
of experience, leading to an increasing anonymity with what is directly experienced, whilst also creating and 
re-creating the experiencing of the world by themselves and others through their agency.  Uexhull (1957) 
argued that an organism integrated experiences of the umwelt in whDW KH WHUPHG WKH ¶FROOHFWLYH XPZHOW·
somewhat similar to notions of the integration of central coherence in psychological theories of autism.  
Interestingly, Uexhull (1957) hypothesised that disruption to an organism could mean that such an integration 
would not operate efficiently. 
It has been theorised by a number of autistic academics that autistic people can be somewhat characterised 
by a fragmented perception and experience of the social lifeworld as described by Alfred Schutz (1967).  
Murray et al. (2005) suggest that autistic people have a tendency toward a monotropic focusing of 
perceptual interest and attention, yet this could be expressed in any number of different variations.  Dawson 
(2012) argued that the cognitive domains within the brains of autistic people tend to work in relative isolation 
to one another.  Pieper (1989) argued that it was the human capacity to reason which allowed them to live in 
¶ZHOW·WKHVRFLDOOLIHZRUOGZKLOVWSODQWVDQGDQLPDOVOLYHGLQDQXQWDPHGXPZHOW$ODFNRIVocial reciprocity 
has often been cited as a deficit contained within the minds of autistic people (Baron-Cohen, 2003).  Yet such 
theories psychologise what is essentially a socially negotiated interactive event.  Indeed, the dispositions of 
autistic people are misunderstood themselves and ostracised for their otherness.  The autistic experience of the 
OLIHZRUOGLVRIWHQIUDJPHQWHGEXWWKHUHDOVRH[LVWVD´GRXEOHHPSDWK\SUREOHPµEHWZHHQLQWHUDFWLQJDJHQWV
of widely differing disposition and perception (Milton, 2012). 
´+HZKRNQRZVGRHVQRWVSHDN+HZKRVSHDNVGRHVQRWNQRZµ² Lao Tzu 
The metaphysical philosophy of Pirsig (1991) suggests a working model of dynamic and static quality to the 
properties of entities.  As an example, language in this conceptualisation has a reified static quality of having 
been inscribed and exchanged.  Dynamic quality however much more resembles the directly experienced 
umwelt as described by Schutz (1967).  Autistic people could be said to exhibit a dynamic quality of 
perception, one less stratified by learnt schemas, one less socialised into obeying normative ideologies, but an 
embodied sociality nonetheless.  Merleau-Ponty (1945) suggested that all consciousness was perceptual, with 
RQH·V VHQVH RI WKH ZRUOG DQG RI RQHVHOI EHing an emergent property, an ongoing becoming.  By seeing 
(autistic) people as uniquely and relativistically embodied, yet within an historical and social nexus, helps to 
dissolve the dogmatic distinctions of mind/body and individual/society. 
 
 




Subverting the hegemony 
´,·PJRQQDZDYHP\IUHDNIODJKLJKµ² Jimi Hendrix  
Despite various tensions between stakeholder groups, a dominant narrative persists in the field of autism 
studies that defines autism as a dysfunctional deviation from an idealised notion of normalcy, with little but 
tokenistic gestures being offered to autistic voices that are more often than not infantalised within debates.  In 
subversion of this hegemony however, have been the growth of autistic narratives and discourse, and the 
development of autistic culture and communities.  In resisting the dominant ableism within the field, the notion 
of impairment and deficit and resultant normalisation agenda must be deconstructed.  Autistic people will 
need to be utilising their voices in, FODLPLQJRZQHUVKLSRIWKH´PHDQVRIDXWLVWLFSURGXFWLRQµDQGSRWHQWLDOO\
celebrate the diversity of dispositions within and without the culture, or in the words of my Great Uncle: 
´,ZLVKQRKDUPWRDQ\KXPDQEHLQJEXW,DVRQHPDQDPJRLQJWRH[HUFLVH my freedom of speech. No human 
being on the face of the earth, no government is going to take from me my right to speak, my right to protest 
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